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ABSTRACT An average medium-sized organisation logs approx. 10 to 500 mln events per day on the
system. Only less than 5% of threat alerts are being investigated by the specialised staff, leaving the
security hole open for potential attacks. Insufficient information in alert message produced in machine-
friendly rather than human-friendly format causes cognitive overload on currently limited cybersecurity
resources. In this paper, the model that generates the report in natural language by means of applying novel
storytelling techniques from security logs is proposed. The solution caters for different levels of reader
expertise and preference by providing adjustable templates, filled from both local and global knowledge base.
The validation is performed on case study from Security Operations Centre (SOC) at educational institution.
The report generated proves superior to existing approach in terms of comprehension (increased cognition)
and completeness (enriched context). The evaluation demonstrates power of storytelling in potential threats
interpretation in cybersecurity context.
INDEX TERMS Cybersecurity, storytelling, threat intelligence, human cognition, information extraction,
knowledge Discovery.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. HIGH-VOLUME OF EVENTS ARE LOGGED,
BUT NOT COMPREHENDED
Millions of activities and attempts are recorded on computer
systems on a daily basis. As an example, a university of
3, 000 staff and 40, 000 students registers approx. 200 mln
events every year. At the same time, only about 20% (or
40 mln) of the logs will be analysed by specialised security
systems. To compare with the volume of events recorded,
the cybersecurity team of such university consists of no more
than 10 trained professionals.
Numerous algorithms have been proposed to automatically
analyse the events and signal alerts for potential malicious
activities [1]. There is a multitude of various types of mon-
itoring systems in use that generate potential threat alerts.
In order to appropriately respond to the suspected threat,
the synthesis of currently disintegrated systems is required.
Still, building the context around the potentially malicious
alert is predominantly a manual task, which involves rich
experience and knowledge regarding log files analysis [1].
Thus, comprehensive alert analysis has become a critical task
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Yassine Maleh .
in harmful events and fraudulent activities detection, their
timely resolution, and future prevention [2].
Although monitoring systems are helpful in filtering
through millions of logged events and generating security
alerts, final human assessment is still part of the process.
As such, thousands of potential security breaches received
from different monitoring systems pose significant burden
on cybersecurity team resources. Given the machine-friendly
rather than human-friendly format of such alerts, as well
as the substantial domain knowledge required, the inter-
pretation of raised alerts is strictly limited to cybersecurity
professionals.
The comprehensive and accurate alert assessment is also
prone to the subjectivity aspect that forms an inherent part of
any human evaluation process. Correct response then highly
depend on long-standing experience of analysts from cyber
threat management field. Dramatically increasing number of
security alerts is currently outgrowing scarce and expensive
cybersecurity resources.
B. KNOWLEDGE BEYOND EVENT LOGS IS
REQUIRED FOR ANALYSIS
Despite the overwhelming volume of security alerts, only
a fraction requires further investigation. Still, the time and
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effort has to be dedicated by security analysts to confirm
that the alert is indeed a false positive or a real incident.
To properly assess the scale of the risk, the knowledge outside
of the security logs is required. Local domain knowledge
determines the risk of internal assets, and the potential risk
of outsider is specified by Global domain knowledge. As an
illustration, consider the examples below:
• Local domain knowledge required: A server of the
organisation X is used for temporary storage and web
testing, and is labelled as a non-critical host. Most
of the alerts from that server can be omitted unless a
serious breach occurs. However, the server is located
in the finance department for financial reporting and
budget planning. Finance department usually holds crit-
ical information. If an alert for a serious breach occurs
for one of the servers in this department, other servers
also can be at the potential cyber risk, warranting fur-
ther investigation despite no explicit alert raised. Thus,
the exceptional defence strategy should be adopted in
advance following the complete knowledge obtained
from an inside of the organisation.
• Global domain knowledge required: The organisation
Y with limited number of experienced cyber profes-
sionals has to prioritise the crucial alerts over large
volume of the remaining security breaches for prompt
response. The selection is based on the prior knowl-
edge and experience based on the repeated alerts from
historical records. An appropriate response for the new
attack requires an in-depth investigation of attacker’s
characteristics. However, the attacker may change its
behaviour over the time for the repeated activities. The
level of expert knowledge is usually not increasing at the
same speed as the complexity of attacks in today’s digital
environment. As a result, a critical alert may not be given
a required priority, leading to delayed response and
potential escalation. Thus, knowledge obtained automat-
ically from external sources is required to stay up to
date with increasingly sophisticated and dynamically
changing cyber attacks.
Both examples show that comprehensive alert analysis
requires domain knowledge from Local and Global. If the
complete knowledge cannot be modelled and integrated in
alert analysis, either false alarms are triggered, or high-risk
alerts are neglected.
C. EXPLAINABLE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)
AND STORYTELLING
In prior research, the automated Cyber Situation Aware-
ness (CSA) tools and models aiming to enhance the cog-
nition of experts have been proposed [3]. As defined by
Endsley: ‘‘Situation awareness is the perception of the ele-
ments of the environment within a volume of time and space,
the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of
their status in the near future’’. As such, situational aware-
ness system has been designed to compile, process, and fuse
data from several different perspectives [4]. Yet, the existing
Cyber Situation Awareness systems have not been able to
address the continuously evolving cybersecurity challenges
completely [3]. Despite helpful, the security experts still have
to digest vast volume of data and discover the hidden links
and dependencies.
Storytelling is a method to assist and engage people to
explore and interpret complex real-world problems. Accord-
ing to Vink [5], telling stories in problem formulation phase
merges synthesis and analysis, and makes abstract con-
cepts more concrete. Storytelling can be used as a knowl-
edge representation method to highlight the explicit and
implicit information from log files, and convert it into a
human-understandable format [6].
Given large volume of logs and alerts, the stories have
to be generated automatically. Automated journalism is a
recent accomplishment in story generation field [7]–[10]. The
story-like technical and financial reports are produced based
on the personal preference, which positively impacts their
comprehension. The approach also outweighs the traditional
‘human’ journalists in both aspects, namely (i) faster reports
generation, and (ii) lower propensity to errors [11]. Consid-
ering its numerous benefits, the automated stories generation
is yet to be explored in security log files interpretation.
Despite promising, the number of limitations of automated
journalism in its current state have been identified, and are as
follows:
1) Stories are based on basic template using the predefined
format adapted to specific domain with high-quality of
data required (flexibility limitation);
2) The mechanism for extension, additional information
integration, and new knowledge contribution is cur-
rently missing (contextual limitation).
In this paper, the automatic generation of storytelling
reports at multiple levels of details (i.e. for expert and non-
expert) provides a comprehensive view of the cyber situation
(i.e. from local and global database) that fills the existing gap
in the analysis of security log records. The model proposed,
unlike current approaches that still (i) rely on security experts
knowledge and expertise, or (ii) are limited in depth of the
insight provided, allows to reveal the root causes of the prob-
lem to facilitate the correct response to the potential threat.
The novelty comes from the human-comprehensible format
of the report, which proved successful in various applications
(e.g. automatic journalist), yet it is still underutilised in cyber-
security domain.
II. RELATED WORK
Much research has been dedicated to minimise human inter-
actions in the process of log files analysis. The representation
approaches of the analytical results can be categorised into
four main categories, namely: ‘Black box’, ‘Visual’, ‘Struc-
tured’, and ‘Narrative’. In this section, the examples of the
works falling within each group will be briefly introduced.
Although the narrative approach has not been used for log
files analysis, it will be discussed from different perspectives
to determine its usability to cyber security domain.
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A. ‘BLACK BOX’
This representation group is named as ‘Black box’ since
there is no explanation, or peering into its internal structure
to justify how and why the analytical process works. The
results usually are presented in the Boolean format to identify
normal and abnormal (malicious) activities. For instance,
abnormal activity was recognised by the application of var-
ious machine learning techniques including Naive Bayes,
K-Nearest Neighbours, and Support Vector Machines to high
volumes of logs by Muggler et al. [2]. ‘Black box’ method
is often considered as untrustworthy as there is insufficient
reasoning about the situation and label assignment. As an
example, a company simulates cyber attacks by a penetration
test. Such activity should not be labelled as abnormal as an
authorised person perform it. How can penetration test activ-
ities be distinguished from real attacks given no explanation?
Without situation awareness, the real attacks can be ignored
by an expert.
B. VISUAL
A significant body of literature has already sought to involve
human supervision in data analysis process by visualisation
techniques utilisation [12]. Visualisation presentation facil-
itates human cognition to improve potential issues identi-
fication [13]. For example, a decision tree (as a level of
analysis display) in the work by Xu et al. [14] was used to
demonstrate how the system decides to assign a normal or
abnormal label to a log record. It is based on limited and
predefined criteria that does not offer the comprehensive
view.
A graph is another presentation, which was used by
Aharon et al. [15] to display system behaviour status. The
graph shows different groups of log messages along with
their labels (normal process or failure process) based on
the clustering algorithm. Clustering similar messages on the
graph is useful, though it does provide further explanation of
why the particular messages belong to the one category.
Samii and Koh [16] considered more aspects of events
by providing a search cability in an interactive query-based
system. The information was displayed on an interactive
visual interface from a high-level view to the original log
files. Li et al. in [17] proposed a system to handle various
types of events logs by providing a facile way of analysing.
Statistic knowledge from logs was extracted and depicted
on a dashboard. An Interactive dynamic query-based form
has also been provided to support to explore more infor-
mation about an event. An interactive visual interface and
visual query-based interactions are bound to specific graphi-
cal features, which cannot fully support analysts to provide
a comprehensive analytical report. For example, an expert
cannot search all connections with‘HTTP post method’ if the
HTTP method is not considered as a design feature in the
interface or dashboard. By considering more design features,
a high level of knowledge and specialist training are required
to understand what should be searched through it, and what
should be expected from the results.
Azodi et al. [18] attempted to address the issue by paths
of attacks identification. Events correlated to an alert were
discovered based on the regular expressions to obtain a bet-
ter understanding of the progress of attack. A graph dis-
played attack paths, and correlation between different attacks
was shown by a link. Although the visual graph provides
more design features and information about the connections
between sources and destinations, the relevant details and
explanations which are necessary for instant inference are
missing. For instance, the graph shows a connection between
server from our organisation to an external web site. However,
it does not show what was the HTTP method used through
this connection. Overall, the existing visualisation interfaces
does not provide sufficient information to distinguish normal
andmalicious connections in order to assist an expert in cyber
situation awareness.
C. STRUCTURED
Numerous studies have attempted to change the log struc-
ture into a rich format to improve the understanding.
Nimbalkar et al. [19] translated log files and added semantics
keywords. The results are demonstrated in the semantic RDF
linked data, which is a machine interpretable representation.
Lack of concepts descriptions and their relations were poten-
tial disadvantages of machine-readable formats for cyber ana-
lysts. Furthermore, the representation format was particularly
challenging for non-experts. In summary, RDF as a structured
data format is highly machine-readable, but is not considered
a good candidate for reporting and analysis by humans.
In cybersecurity area, information exchange formats were
proposed to enhance knowledge of every single participant
to address the lack of comprehensive analysis in the use
of gathering all significant aspects [20]. Structured Threat
Information eXpression (STIX) [21] and Incident Object
Description and Exchange Format (IODEF) [22] are two of
them. STIX is focused mostly on cyber threat intelligence
from a holistic perspective, and IODEF is concentrated on
attackers and defenders information. They are created for
various purposes [23], and machine-readable format makes it
extremely challenging to understand the components and the
relations between them. The only human-readable exchange
format is X-ARF [24]. However, the X-ARF is a basic format
that can only exchange limited types of malicious alerts via
an email. The email contains limited information such as
alert description, alert category, initial information about the
attack and attacker [25]. The exchange formats transfer alert
messages to a new structure and add descriptions to enrich
it. Therefore, the main aim of them is sharing the alert mes-
sage, not interpreting the alert message and providing more
evidence for improved understanding.
D. NARRATIVE
While narrative activity is a sense-making process rather than
a finished product [26], a narrative explanation can be a
good candidate in analysis facilitation. Currently, no efforts
have been made in cybersecurity analysts support by using
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the narrative formats. Wu et al. [6] proposed a data-driven
storytelling system for social connections improvement.
The system transformed sensor data from IOT devices of
elder’s conditions for their loved ones in order to support a
social connection between an alone elder and his/her family.
Raw data was mapped to semantically meaningful variables
through a GoalNet, and the dynamic storylines were gen-
erated based on a set of curiosity rules. Wu et al. [6] only
provided one level of explanation in their output results to
attract the adult children’s attention. Although the system
could not explain the details of the elder‘s conditions and
refer to a triggered sensor as evidence, they believed they
reached their aims to captivate the adult children’s atten-
tion. A multi-level story from the alert message can be a
novel approach to support the analytical process in cyber
security domain. Simple concepts in sequential sentences can
be organised to discern where the events are heading. It is
easier for a human beings to identify correlations of events
in the log files when they are modelled using storytelling
design [11].
III. TERMINOLOGY
a: KNOWLEDGE BASE
In this paper, we use two main databases (Local and Global)
to obtain contextual insight about an alert. In term of com-
pleteness, internal sources and external sources are provided
to enable sufficient level of comprehension.
Local knowledge base includes supplementary information
that is internally processed, as well as the raw data collected
from the security devices. Local knowledge base contains
explicit knowledge about the situation of the event. The
implicit knowledge is added to the knowledge base by prede-
fined rules and procedures. Local Knowledge base contains
(1) List of the internal servers and hosts with the associated
information, including domain name, administrator, sever-
ity (low, medium, high), location, and installed applications
(2) Story templates, (3) Rules for analysis,(4) Regular expres-
sions, and (4) List of keywords.
Global knowledge base contains supplementary infor-
mation that is collected by external companies and
researchers, and is processed internally. Global knowledge
base is comprised of the following Information (1) Whois
Command [27], (2) Virus Total,1 (3) Threat Miner,2
(4) AlienVault,3 (5) Snort Rules (6) Windows Defender
Security Intelligence (WDSI),4 and (7) Symantec.5
b: EVENT
In this paper, the event is a status of the action that is recorded
in the log by the monitoring system.
1https://www.virustotal.com/
2https://www.threatminer.org/
3https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/
4https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats
5https://www.symantec.com/security-center/a-z/
c: ALERT
The alert is a generatedmessagewhen abnormal event occurs.
The security devices generate alert when observe that a part
of an event specification matches their predefined patterns.
The generatedmessage (called an alert message in this paper),
provides a short description for further analysis.
d: REPORT (SECURITY REPORT)
The report is a document that presents detailed information
about the alert to assist the analysts to understand more about
the abnormal events registered.
IV. LOG-DRIVEN STORYTELLING MODEL
The proposed model that consists of four individual layers
and main procedures is illustrated in Figure 1. The details of
each layer, i.e. primary purpose and associated steps are as
follows:
A. PRE-PROCESSING LAYER
In this layer, alert message is parsed to extract the basic
fields. The fields include Time, Date, Source Internet Proto-
col (SrcIP), Destination Internet Protocol (DesIP), as relevant
to the alert. The alert generated by the Security Information
and Event Management (SIEM) system6 was used in the case
study.
Since the selected fields are primary properties in each
alert message, the proposed approach does not depend on the
specific device. An alert record L can be represented as {Date,
Time, SrcIP, DesIP, Message} from the alert’s message by the
monitoring systems.
• Date and Time values represent when the events are
registered. These values can be different from alert Date
and Time (as received after an event).
• Source Internet Protocol (SrcIP) value represents the
address of the initiator of an event. In other words, who
is the source of the connection (Subject or Object of an
event).
• Destination Internet Protocol (DesIP) represents the
objects of the events. In other words, DesIP is an address
to which the connection has been made (Subject or
Object of the event).
• Message value represents behaviors, which Subject con-
duct towards the Object. This value usually includes the
classification group name for threat. Since this paper
considers malware category, the value contains terms
such as ‘malware’ or ‘trojan’.
A collection of regular expressions is used to parse and
tokenise the alert messages. The delimiters include ‘/’, ‘?’,
‘.’, ‘=’, ‘-’, and ‘_’. The extraction parsers and tools before
this layer are applied as pre-processing. The outputs produced
will be further used in the Extraction layer.
6The approach is not limited to SIEM systems, and can be easily adopted
to alerts from other monitoring systems
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FIGURE 1. Overview of the Log-Driven Storytelling Model made of four layers (beige boxes) and operation procedures (white boxes, except the story
layer). The story layer represents the final output with modification capability.
B. EXTRACTION LAYER
Although selection and retrieval of basic fields from an alert
message is performed, the basic information about the alert,
the relationships between basic fields and corresponding
information allows to spot the potential logical links.
In this layer, the alert message is complemented with sup-
plementary information to compensate for the lack of data,
which leads to insufficient understanding [3]. As a result, full
awareness about the alert situation from various heteroge-
neous sources such as different departments and owners can
be achieved [28]. Associated information to the alert message
is extracted from Local and Global knowledge base, which
are mapped to the extracted basic fields in L (Extraction
layer). The extraction layer consists of 3 main stages, which
use different fields of L.
The 1st stage looks into the aggregated logs files that use
Date and Time when the events were synchronised. Every
single log record in log file has the Date and Time references.
Events are sorted based on the time sequence. Date and Time
of an event comes from the basic fields in L and log files,
which are gathered log records from a variety of network
devices. Binary search in terms of time is applied to retrieve
events in a particular time interval. Since some logs are
recorded based on the UTC, and others are recorded based
on the local time, to cover all the related logs +/ − 1 day
timespan is applied. The log file also provides the information
about source and destination IP for the connection. Therefore,
the corresponding connection between SrcIP and DesIP are
found by tracing the entire particular interval. The output of
this stage is a list of events that represent the connection
between the source and destination that happened in the
particular time interval.
The 2nd stage searches Local and Global knowledge base
to find out about the IP address and Domain Information
(which IP belongs to the organisation and which is from
the outside, thus suspicious to be a source of infection).
In this stage, Whois command identifies the names within a
given registrar’s registry. Therefore, the other registry out of
organisation is used as external. Furthermore, each organisa-
tion provides a list of IP address ranges based on their own
network architecture. The matched IP address to this list is
considered as internal. After determining the connection type:
from Internal to External or from External to Internal, the cor-
responding information from Local and Global knowledge
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base is extracted. The Global knowledge base contains set of
information based on the online public repositories such as
‘‘Virus Total’’ [29] and ‘‘Threat Miner’’ [30]. Each set repre-
sents the IP address, which is recorded in a black list, Domain
names, Geography Location of the server, and URLs7 that
were repeated in previous infections (cause to be reported in
a block list). Local knowledge base contains set of relevant
information about internal hosts/servers (IP address, domain
name, administrator, location, severity, and installed applica-
tion). Although update of the Local and Global knowledge
base is computationally expensive, it is a trade-off between
automatic and complete information extraction, and the time
and effort required for manual search.
The 3rd stage uses alert message to map to the Snort [31]
Rules to extract the complete malware classification phrase.
Snort is a lightweight network intrusion detection system that
uses rules to perform content pattern matching and detect a
variety of malware. Snort Rules are open source and used
in variety of security devices. By mapping the message field
fromL to the Snort malware rules, the complete phrase for the
infection is extracted. While Snort and Snort Rules are usu-
ally thought of as a list of independent - open source patterns
to be tested in matching engines of security devices, the alert
message usually contains Snort classification label, which
defines the malware category [32]. In this paper, the approach
is limited to security devices that lie at the core of Snort as a
matching engine. Since Snort is popular Intrusion Detection
System, this is not a severe limitation and variety of commer-
cial and open-source devices worked with the Snort Rules.
C. INFERENCE LAYER
In this layer, information is analysed by using the artefact
metadata and machine learning techniques to reconstruct the
past events to answer three core questions about the actor
(who), riskiness (what), and evidence (how) of the event in
relevant logs. To understand who is the actor and what is
the purpose of the action, the associated information to the
malicious website has been extracted in the Extraction layer.
There is still insufficient level of detail that would explain
what is the aim of an action. Thus, the malware definition is
automatically extracted from webpage articles that may carry
the sentences related to malware explanation. To accomplish
this goal, we borrow the idea from [33] and use a scraper
to monitor each website in the list of top security technical
blogs to extract the associated supplementary information.
It should be noted here that although the list of websites is
limited, the approach is not restricted to them and the list can
be customised. The examples of websites used in the case
study are:
• AlienVault
• Symantec
• Windows Defender Security Intelligence (WDSI)
7Uniform Resource Locator (URL) form a part of the Uniform Resource
Identifier (URI), and serves as a pointer to where the resources are located
and the procedure to fetch them.
The scrapers perform the breadth-first crawling on each
website to search for themalware classification phrase found
in the Extraction layer. Document Object Model (DOM) trees
are generated for pages that are characterised by the same
HTML template. These pages contain relevant definitions as
opposed to the ones with e.g. logins, subscriptions, advertise-
ments - considered as non-relevant. All pages’ DOM trees are
compared to identify the node with the combination of the
tokenised phrase from the malware classification phrase +
’is’ + text under the node with title ’summary’, ’definition’
or ’ behaviour’, starting with ’this malware’, ’this virus’, or
’this trojan’. It is the way of providing further details about
the malware and clarify the aim of an action.
To obtain more information about the riskiness of an event,
the information from potentially compromised internal server
is applied to the list of rules to derive proofs. The proof is
a sequence of the conclusions that demonstrates the risk of
an event based on the internal information. A set of rules is
used to infer valid conclusion, which defines the risk. The
risk is based on the internal assets values in terms of location
and severity. For example, a server in financial department
faces higher risk than other departments. The values of the
severity and location from the Internal Info (Figure 1) can
fire more than one rule. The output of the triggered rules are
the template sentences about the risk, which will be selected
to complete the story in the subsequent layer (Story Layer).
To provide the evidence of relevant events to the alert,
the extracted information (URL, Downloaded files,and Com-
munication files) from the external malicious website is
searched among the relevant logs. This purpose is served by
the application of k-Mean clustering on extracted URL to
frame it as a classification problem. Input URLs are divided
into disjoint subsets, then for each URL in each subset the
distance to all the other URLs in the same subset is computed,
and the URL that has the lowest sum of distances should
be the centrist. To extract the max-length URL from each
subset, the NLTK library, which offers an Ngrams function to
iterate over values of N, is used. Then, the max-length URL
from each subset, which presents the pattern of the URL,
is searched among the relevant logs to extract the evidence.
Repeated URLs are removed and the URL as a symptom is
selected to enrich the report.
D. STORY LAYER
Story generation from analytically enriched data is the main
contribution of this paper. It is much easier for human beings
to find the correlations between events in the log files if they
are modelled using storytelling design. A story can incorpo-
rate different aspects of an event and can convey the meaning
of an alert. Therefore both competence and comprehension
are achieved by explaining the security alert in the storytelling
design.
The story can be personalised based on the needs and
preferences of the individual reader [11]. As Figure 1 shows,
the intended audience can be selected in the ’Send to Group’
section of the interface and the appropriate template based on
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their preference is shown in the Story section. The template
is modifiable and can be customised based on the preference
and internal policy. Each template contains set of variables
(the yellow border) that are initialised through the previous
layers. In this layer, the retrieved information and analytical
results, which are automatically stored in the Local knowl-
edge base are used to replace the variables in the story. Each
variable contains it own original layer. For example, Date
and Time are the variables that were extracted from the alert
message in the Pre-processing Layer.
The riskiness of the event is explained in the separate
templates based on the triggered rules, and are used to enrich
the message with more internal recommendation. The results
are the knowledge sets, and the relationships between them.
In other words, the story is generated based on the template,
and the relationships between retrieval information from pre-
vious layers. The generated story can be set as the ’Ticket’ for
future actions as a response to an incident, ’Report’ for man-
agement, and ’Post’ for broadcasting to increase an awareness
about what has happened. Although storytelling design is
template-based, the templates and rules are easily modifiable
without an extensive technical expertise. The customisation
can be achieved based on the organisational demands.
V. CASE STUDY
In order to validate the model proposed, the case study
on real-world scenario was conducted. More specifically,
the report generated by Log-Driven Storytelling Model was
compared with the report generated by external vendor’s
tool - the Secureworks.8
Secureworks is the commercial cybersecurity analytical
tool used by the SOC team at the educational institute. More
specifically, Secureworks provides Incident Response Ser-
vices for potential cyber threats detection among the mon-
itored log files, and alert their clients by appropriate report
generation. The vendor claims to combine human-machine
analytical capability to assist in information security ser-
vices. According to Secureworks, ‘‘to ensure that even if our
machine learning models occasionally encounter an issue,
Human and Machine are Working Together’’ [34]. Thus,
the report generation still relies on human assistance to derive
actionable cyber threat intelligence.
As for technical details, the machine side of Secureworks
manages the logs from approx. 800 servers at the educa-
tion institute, 2000 − 6000 MPS9 (low - holiday period,
high - semester period), and 600 − 700 high-risk incidents
per year. The human side involves manual assistance and
human-understandable report format generation about the
incident registered (for the customer to understand their
cybersecurity situation).
The example of the alert message produced by Secure-
works is as follows:
8https://www.secureworks.com/
9Message Per Second
MALWARE-CNC Osx.Keylogger-Elite - 10.
233.62.247 -> 104.239.223.14 02/27/2019
5:05 PM
A. PRE-PROCESSING LAYER
The basic fields (i.e. {(Date, Time, SrcIP, DesIP, Message)})
were extracted from the alert using regular expressions pre-
sented in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Regular expressions used in the case study.
B. EXTRACTION LAYER
The information relevant to the basic fields were retrieved in
the following stages.
The 1st stage: The relevant logs were identified based
on Date and Time as well as source-destination connection.
In order to ensure the coverage of maximum number of
potentially relevant events, the timespan was set to 1 day
before and 1 day after an event. Since Date and Time of an
incident (based on the extracted basic fields) was 02/27/2019
5:05 PM, the timespan was set to the following: 02/26/2019
5:0 PM - 02/28/2019 5:0 PM (to allow all the devices to
record their logs). In total, 644, 434, 681 logs were recorded
by monitoring devices at the university throughout the time
interval specified. After filtering based on both SrcIP and
DesIP, the number of events was reduced to 12. This pro-
vides the final list of events that represent the connections
that occurred between SrcIP and DesIP within the timespan
specified.
The 2nd stage: The SrcIP was marked as Internal (by
comparing with organisation IP addresses range), and the
DesIP was marked as External (by applyingWhois command
and comparing with registry).
The retrieved information (i.e. IP, Domain, Admin, Sever-
ity, Location, Installed Application) about the internal server
in the alert message including IP 10.233.62.247, and stored
in the Local knowledge base is:
Internal Server = {(10.233.62.247, Sev1.edu.au, Tommy
Schart, IT-developer group, CoNsoleKit Microsoft Visual
C++)
The retrieved information (i.e. IP, Domain, URLs, Loca-
tion) about the external server in the alert message includ-
ing IP 104.239.223.14, and stored in the Global knowledge
base is:
External Server = {(104.239.223.14, service.
macinstallerinfo.com, Urls*,10 US)
The 3rd stage: Since this paper focuses only on mal-
ware, only Snort rules related to malware with the following
10Because of the large number of URLs, not all are defined here.
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FIGURE 2. The reports generated in response to the security alert by both the default (a) and the proposed (b) solution.
titles were searched to identify the matched classification
phrases: snort3-malware-backdoor.rules,snort3-malware-
cnc.rules,snort3-malware-other.rules, snort3-malware-tools.
rules. The matched Snort rule, which was mapped to the
message part from the basic field, was as follows:
alert tcp HOME_NET any ->
EXTERNAL_NET HTTP_PORTS (
msg:"MALWARE-CNC Osx.Keylogger.Elite
variant outbound connection";
flow:to_server,established; http_uri;
content:"/read-mip.php",fast_pattern,
nocase;metadata:impact_flag
red,policy balanced-ips drop,policy
security-ips drop; service:http;
reference:url,virustotal.com/en/file/
e23cae7189d6ca9c649afc22c638a45fd94f
19ef6b-585963164cca52c7b80f9b/analysis/;
classtype:trojan-activity; sid:41458;
rev:1; )
C. INFERENCE LAYER
The purpose of this layer is to answer the what, who
and why questions about the incident. ‘‘MALWARE-CNC
Osx.Keylogger.Elite variant outbound connection’’ was the
malware classification phrase (according to: Extraction layer,
3rd stage). The definition of this malware was extracted from
web articles in cybersecurity field stored inGlobal knowledge
base. The extracted definition for the case studywas compiled
as follows:malware classification phrase+ ’is’+ behaviour.
The definition was found under the ‘Behaviour’ node from
the Symantec website,11 and included:
‘‘OSX.Keylogger is a spyware program for Mac OS
X that records keystrokes, may take screenshots,
and may also send the information to a predeter-
mined email address.’’
Then, the malicious URLs were classified into five classes,
each represented by the max-length URL. These were
11https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2010-041918-
0517-99
searched among the 12 relevant logs to provide an evidence
for the incident. The URL that was matched in the relevant
logs was randomly selected for use in the next layer. Since the
infected server was not located in the financial department,
and the severity was Medium, 2 rules based on Severity and
Location were triggered, and the corresponding template for
each of them was selected.
D. STORY LAYER
The story based on the automatic retrieval of the variables
from previous layers was generated in this layer. Complete
template was contrasted against the report obtained from the
commercial tool.
The report produced by the proposed model (Figure 2a)
was compiled fully automatically, while the Secureworks
report (Figure 2b) required both machine processing and
human assistance.
E. EVALUATION
Since formal evaluation of narrative format of both reports is
qualitative in nature, the improvement in cyber threat man-
agement proves a challenging task. In this paper, we focused
on the core questions to be answered in the report (i.e. actor
(who), riskiness (what), and evidence (how)) as a basic for
the proposed model evaluation. Thus, the following two cri-
teria were defined: (1) Completeness, and (2) Comprehen-
sion. In our case, the completeness refers to the amount of
information required to obtain full comprehension about the
situation. By assumption, the storytelling model due to its
auto-fill function from various knowledge bases provide the
complete information required to take action. On the other
hand, the standard report (Secureworks in this case) entails
manual search for missing information. To increase results
reliability, the additional 10 alerts were investigated.
Since different types of alerts require different investiga-
tion time, the random sample of 11 alerts in total messages
was selected. An expert from the SOC team was involved in
the empirical alert analysis consisting of filling the missing
information from internal and external sources (similarly to
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TABLE 2. Emprical Results.
the model proposed). The Secureworks reports for the alerts
classified as malware (Potential Device Compromise) were
obtained between 11/02.2019 and 28/02/2019 at the educa-
tion institute. Table 2 shows the status of the knowledge
required to complete the report (‘Completeness’ header). The
expert manually retrieved the necessary information, and
the extraction time was measured in seconds (‘Complete-
ness Time’ header). The average extraction time across the
11 malware alerts was 1455.(36) s (approx. 25 mins). Thus,
in total it took approx. 30 mins to answer the core questions
about the actor, riskiness, and evidence (completeness =
25 mins + comprehension = 5 mins). As a result, the pro-
posed model reduced the time to respond based on the full
understanding of the situation by approx. 83% (25/30). In
the storytelling model, given sufficient information on what,
who, and why aspects, the time taken to obtain complete
comprehension about an alert is approx. 5 mins (= 300 s).
The time required for understanding is directly related to
the degree of completeness (missing information has to be
searched and extracted manually).
We also investigated the scenario where the 11 alerts
occurred in a consecutive manner (busy period). To avoid
potential damage and further escalation, the alerts should
be addressed immediately. Time to respond to all alerts was
set as a cumulative sum of Completeness + Comprehension
Time of each consecutive alert. Since the alerts are pro-
cessed sequentially, the total response time builds up. Table 3
demonstrates the cumulative delay time to respond to an alert
in the case of 11 consecutive alerts received in a day. Given
the scenario, the proposed model has the potential to reduce
the response time by approx. 17000 s (approx. 6 days) in
comparison with the report derived in a semi-manual manner
TABLE 3. Empirical evaluation of the consecutive alerts.
by the SOC team (existing approach). Please note that human
limitation and environment limitation were not considered in
the experiment.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. STUDY CONTRIBUTIONS
The improvement from human-computer interaction perspec-
tive in security alerts handling will be discussed using the
main two criteria: (1) Completeness, and (2) Comprehension.
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Completeness: The information in the Secureworks report
was insufficient for prompt inference, and the SOC member
had to manually gather the complementary data from dif-
ferent sources. For instance, the information about the risk
severity (medium) as well as the internal location of the device
(IT-developer group) were missing. Also, the action rec-
ommendation (check the system and images) and person
designation (admin Tommy) proved beneficial for timely and
coordinated response. The utilisation of Local and Global
knowledge bases aimed to provide the rich and compre-
hensive context around the incident. The template was
filled using both internal information as well as the exter-
nal sources. While the proposed model extracted the rele-
vant knowledge automatically, the Secureworks report still
required human involvement in the process. Also, the inter-
pretation of cybersecurity is heavily reliant on analytical
experience and knowledge (where and how to search for
relevant information?), which puts strain on already scarce
cybersecurity resources.
Comprehension:Narrative technique application in cyber
risk management domain was aimed to reduce the cogni-
tive load imposed on cybersecurity analysts while processing
the large number of logs. The reports generated in story-
telling manner provedmore human-readable, facilitated com-
prehension, and effectively allowed for faster response to
potential threat (time factor is found crucial in cybersecurity
domain). Also, human-friendly format of the report con-
tributed towards wider audience engagement into cyber situa-
tion awareness (currently restricted to security professionals).
As an example, the user of the infected device can receive
the storytelling report and obtain an insight into the cyber sit-
uation instantly, thus preventing further problem escalation.
The narrative format assists understanding despite lack of
expertise in cyber security domain. Finally, the capability to
provide the reports at different level of details automatically
enabled to cater for various information needs and intended
aim (i.e. low-level for Security Operation Centre, high-level
for Top Management).
Summary: By comparison between the generated story
and the Secureworks report, the following can be inferred:
• The storytelling report is generated fully automatically,
reducing the burden on cybersecurity resources;
• The implicit knowledge (what happened and why?),
which analysts have to investigate manually, is included
in the generated story;
• The log files with private information that cannot be sent
to the third party for further processing are protected.
In terms of the current limitations, in this paper we only
focused on malware taxonomy for approach demonstration.
Still, the model can be easily adapted to other types of inci-
dents by providing the complementary sources in Local and
Global knowledge base. Also, since the enriched report for
a security alert in a story design is not available, we were
not able to perform the direct comparison with the proposed
storytelling model. Thus, the impact of the narrative format
has been assumed to be beneficial for cognitive workload
reduction based on empirical observation at SOC team at the
university.
In terms of future directions, the proposed solution can
be extended beyond the educational sector. Cyber threats
are currently commonplace across organisations. The overall
benefits of narrative style would contribute staff comprehen-
sion, regardless the industry. Also, the additional validation
metrics (readability score, user survey, time-to-respond, etc.)
on larger-scale data could be provided to further confirm the
benefits of the approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
The report generated by the proposed model proved to be
more complete andmore comprehensible for the SOC team in
comparison with the Secureworks report. As a result, the cog-
nitive effort in information digestion and understanding was
significantly reduced. Also, due to the human-friendly for-
mat, a wide range of staff with different levels of expertise
was able to be involved in cyber risk management process.
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